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Résumé:       
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the properties of EVA® compensation schemes, which 
were  considered as a major managerial innovation of the 90's. The analysis is 
carried on in the framework of contract theory and based on a six year 
longitudinal case study. Such schemes induce highly volatile bonuses compared 
to more traditional ones. This is interpreted as a loss of controllability, where 
controllability is defined as the controllability of their performance measured by 
managers. The role of the target setting, based on external standards, and the 
absence of renegotiation are of particular significance in explaining this loss. This 
analysis explains the difficulties encountered in the implementation of these 
schemes and their relative decline.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the nineties many publicly traded companies adopted value based management under 
the growing pressure of Wall Street (Martin and Petty, 2000). A collection of new 
metrics to be used as performance measures appeared (Myers, 1996). New 
compensation plans for managers were designed. The EVA system (Stewart, 1991, Stern 
et al., 1995) emerged as a leading approach.1  The underlying ideas, far from new in 
many aspects, were considered as “sufficiently thoughtful and arresting to warrant being 
included amongst the most significant contributions of recent years to management 
accounting” (O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 1998, p. 442). As is common with management 
innovations, after a hot time, there are more firms that drop these approaches than there 
are new adopters. Rankings of companies based on EVA and MVA have progressively 
disappeared from business magazines. This paper provides some evidence to interpret 
this historical trend.  
 
The motivation put forward by the protagonists of EVA is to make managers run their 
business units as owners. EVA is assumed to be aligned with market values. As a 
performance measure, it is said to be decomposable within the organization thus 
providing more controllable incentives to operational managers than stock options based 
on the market value of the entire company. Some of these assertions have been 
questioned. Is it really the case that EVA is better correlated to excess returns than more 
traditional accounting measures such as earnings per share (Biddle et al., 1996, Bacidore 
et al., 1997, Stark and Thomas, 1998)? Can it be demonstrated that an annual 
performance measure can meaningfully summarize the multi-period value of investment 
(Reichelstein, 1997, Rogerson, 1997, Bromwitch and Walker, 1998, Mouritsen, 1998)? 
Is it the case that EVA promotes alignment with the shareholders’ objective (Lovata and 
Costigan, 2002) or within the firm (Riceman et al., 2002)? Pragmatically, is it the case 
EVA adopters generate higher returns (Wallace, 1997, Kleiman, 1999)? After all, what 
is really known about the empirical reasons for adopting EVA and the ways it has been 
implemented (Haspeslagh et ali., 2001, Mottis and Ponssard, 2001-2002, Malmi and 
Ikäheimo, 2003)? 
 
This previous literature will be discussed using the framework of contract theory 
(Lambert, 2001, Prendergast, 1999). Two dimensions of analysis are investigated in 
details: congruity (alignment of the performance measure with the objectives of the 
principal) and controllability (the presence in the performance indicator of noisy factors 
out of control of the agent). It will be shown that the previous literature on EVA focuses 
on the congruity dimension and completely neglects the controllability one. This paper 
shows that it should not. An in depth field study of an EVA compensation scheme, over 
a 6 year period, points to a large loss in controllability, where controllability is defined 
as the controllability of their performance measured by the managers. Several 
hypothesis are tested to explain that loss. Does it come from the performance measure 
because of noisy factors? does it come from the target setting process? or does it come 
from the implementation process and the lack of negotiation that goes with it?  Note that 
our discussion is not limited on the EVA performance measure as such but encompasses 
the whole EVA compensation system. 
 
                                                 
1 EVA®  is a trademark of  Stern & Stewart Co. 
The lack of controllability of  EVA® explains its decline. F. Larmande and JP Ponssard           March  2007                            page 1                                     
The main conclusion is that the loss of controllability comes from the target setting 
process and from the lack of negotiation, and not from the performance measure as such. 
The standards (targets) in EVA are to be derived from “external” market expectations, 
and not from “internal” goals such as budget.2 Determining of an annual short term 
standard from share prices that represent the long term market value of the company 
requires a set of ad hoc assumptions. Furthermore, that external global standard has to 
be decomposed within the organization into local standards for many “EVA centers”. 
Setting such local standards in a consistent way again requires ad hoc assumptions. 
Altogether this process makes local managers resent the target setting process as a 
“black box” which they can influence neither ex-ante nor ex-post through negotiations. 
Relevant local information, i.e. the “noise” about which the local managers may know 
about, cannot be introduced into the target or into the performance measure. On the 
contrary, this local information can often be introduced into an internal process, the 
construction of which is understood by the managers. While Jensen (2001) sees the use 
of external standards in EVA has an important theoretical reason to encourage its 
diffusion (in particular to avoid gaming with internal budget targets, a point that needs 
to be kept in mind as well), this paper shows that in practice the external EVA target 
setting has drawbacks of its own. The case study will show how these drawbacks are 
mitigated through successive changes in the EVA incentive plans to partly restore the 
controllability of the performance measure for the managers. Altogether these changes 
will be interpreted as a relative departure from the pure EVA scheme towards more 
traditional ones. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses EVA along the lines of contract 
theory, reviews the literature and elaborates the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
the methodological conditions under which the longitudinal study was carried out. The 
case study is presented in section 4 and the hypotheses tested in section 5. The results 
are put in a broader perspective in section 6 by discussing their relevance with respect to 
the emergence and decline of EVA as a compensation system. 
 
 
 
 
2. EVA and contract theory: review of the literature and research hypotheses 
 
The two dimensions of contract theory, congruity and controllability, and their potential 
links, are discussed in sequence. The insights provided by the current literature on EVA 
are reviewed. Some new ideas are introduced along the way. This leads to the research 
hypotheses which are detailed in the last part of this section.  
 
2.1. Is EVA a congruent performance measure?  
 
From a conceptual point of view (Lambert, 2001, section 3) the congruity issue (some 
authors use the term congruence) concerns the bias between the value function pursued 
by the firm (for instance the maximization of its long term market value) and the 
aggregated performance measure used for incentive purposes (for instance an 
accounting measure). The value function may be neither observable nor contractible 
while the performance measure should be. It may incorporate a lot of noise making it 
                                                 
2 The classification of standards as external versus internal is discussed in Murphy, 2001. 
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inappropriate for incentive purposes. As a consequence, the performance measure may 
only be imperfectly aligned with the value function. The degree of alignment between 
the objective of the shareholders and the objective of the managers is a major issue to 
clarify in a compensation system.  
 
EVA schemes address this issue in four steps (O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 1998): 
a) the design of a yearly performance measure, the well known notion of residual 
income is used as a starting point 
b) the introduction of adjustments regarding accounting conservatism relative to 
goodwill, R&D expenses…, earnings management relative to provisions for bad 
debt, warranties… , methods to value assets … to derive economic value added 
from residual income 
c) the determination of appropriate benchmarks to evaluate value creation, through a 
methodology that in principle makes the variation of EVA from previous year to 
this year related to the excess return expected by the shareholders 
d) the introduction of a bonus bank.  
    
In this process, the ultimate goal is (a) to collapse performance management into a 
robust, single-period accounting measure, (b) to use present value preserving 
adjustments to make this yearly measure unaffected by inappropriate accounting rules, 
(c) to introduce non zero benchmarks to allow for growing or declining environments 
whenever a steady state is inappropriate, (d) to use the bonus bank “as a last line of 
defense” (O’Hanlon and Peasnell, p. 410) to induce managers to have a long term 
perspective.  
 
The literature has discussed the first point in details. Then a number of studies have 
discussed the general idea of congruence at the empirical level. 
 
Can it be demonstrated that an annual performance measure can meaningfully 
summarize the multi-period value of investment? Using simple multi-period 
frameworks, Reichelstein (1997) and Rogerson (1997) prove that this can be done. But 
this formal result depends on assumptions which may seem quite restrictive. They focus 
on the investment decision, the effort choice problem is not explicitly analyzed and is 
solved independently. As a result, there is no mention that an increased congruity on the 
investment decision side could lead to a less controllable monitoring on the effort side.  
 
 
 
Can it be said that EVA is adopted to increase congruity? Lovata and Costigan (2002) 
investigate the EVA adoption rate in an agency context. They consider that a 
combination of high institutional ownership and low insider ownership may create a 
congruity issue between shareholders and managers. They show that EVA is a possible 
answer: the more the firms are subject to agency issues the more they tend to use EVA. 
They also show that the R&D ratio is a limiting factor to this tendency, which they 
relate to the difficulty to construct adjustments to obtain an economic meaningful 
performance indicator, both timely and through the organization. Riceman et al. (2002) 
evaluate the comparative efficiency of managers in relation to the incentive schemes set 
up within a firm that had selectively adopted EVA. This case study is based on 
questionnaires in which managers are asked to evaluate the relationship between the 
compensatory scheme that applied to them (EVA or not) and their own performance. 
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Findings show that the higher level of congruity that goes with EVA is an important 
factor to explain the higher efficiency of the managers involved. The authors point out 
that the choice of a single indicator along hierarchical lines facilitates organizational 
congruity, but that indicators others than EVA may do as well in this respect.  
 
Some econometric studies relate the actual value creation for the firm (through its stock 
price) to the adoption of EVA, and see this as an indirect proof of the better congruity of 
EVA than traditional accounting indicators. For instance, Wallace (1997) and Kleiman 
(1999) provide some support that firms that adopt EVA obtain better excess returns than 
non adopters, and that the actual use of EVA for incentive purposes is key to obtain the 
result. This reasoning has been questioned along two lines. Firstly, Biddle et al. (1996) 
showed that excess returns are better explained by earnings than by residual incomes, so 
why use EVA? But this comparative analysis do not use the actual adjusted “house 
made” EVA which may still be a better indicator than earnings. Secondly, such market 
studies may be subject to many more influential factors than the change in the incentive 
schemes for the managers. 
 
Indeed, empirical studies such as Haspeslagh et ali. (2001), Mottis and Ponssard (2001-
2002), Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) do point out the large variance in implementing 
EVA: what is the involvement of top management, to what extent EVA is part of a more 
radical strategic change, to which extent is EVA cascaded down in the organization, 
what is the target process...Yet, all these studies share the fact that the motivation of the 
top management is to promote value creation all through the organization, i.e. to align 
the objective of the managers on the objective of the stakeholders.  
 
This review of literature makes clear that congruity is seen as a key feature by the 
protagonists of EVA and by the top managers that implement EVA in their company. 
The theoretical and empirical research has reinforced this view, no strong arguments 
against it have been provided. Consultants have designed a number of tools and 
procedures to implement this feature of EVA.    
 
2.2. Why EVA may not be controllable 
 
Controllability issues are related to the noisy factors that affect the performance measure 
and are not under the control of the managers. Intuitively, it seems reasonable that a 
manager should be accountable only for outcomes that are under his control. Contract 
theory makes this more precise through the informativeness principle (Holmstrom, 
1979). Traditional variance analysis as discussed in accounting analysis need to be more 
sophisticated (Baiman and Demski, 1980). Relative performance evaluation may be 
used (Antle and  Demski, 1988, and Lambert, 2001, section 2.6).  
 
The literature on controllability ordinarily focuses on the noise in the performance 
measure itself. This noise may come from external sources (environment) or from 
internal ones (decisions made in the firm, i.e. by the corporate, but not controlled by the 
managers). In this respect, it is reasonably easy to compare measures actually used firms 
such as NOPAT or ROCE with EVA. The explicit linkage of EVA with accounting 
figures makes it as easily decomposable in the organization as these traditional 
measures.3 Adjustments to derive EVA from residual income are transparent. 
                                                 
3 The information process for EVA  is usually monitored by an “EVA administrator” who typically belongs to 
the control department. 
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Consequently, substituting EVA for these accounting measures should not induce a 
relative loss of controllability.  
 
This relative assessment does not mean that there is no intrinsic controllability issue 
when decomposing a global performance measure to business units. Bromwich and 
Walker (1998) review EVA schemes in the light of the early implementations of 
residual incomes (Solomons, 1965). For these authors, the important (controllability) 
issues which appeared at that time remain relevant for EVA: the question of 
decentralization within the firm, the fact that some decisions depend more on corporate 
than on divisional decision making, the need to distinguish between managers 
evaluation and the assessment of divisional performance. The question to keep in mind 
is how severe are these qualifications in the context of the application under study. 
 
Checking all these considerations to see whether EVA as a performance measure 
generates a loss of controllability relative to traditional measures such as NOPAT or 
ROCE provides a first line of investigation. 
 
To these well known sources of noise, two other indirect sources should be added: 
firstly, the existence of noise in the target setting process (arbitrariness in setting 
standards) and, secondly, the absence of negotiation when going from the performance 
outcome to the bonus payment itself.  These two factors will be discussed in sequence. 
 
The standards of an EVA scheme are derived from market expectations and not from 
internal negotiations. Does a noise in this target setting generates a possible loss of 
controllability? From a theoretical standpoint, and as an illustrative example, consider 
the case of linear bonus schemes. A noisier target does not affect the intensity (slope) of 
the scheme but it increases the risk premium to be paid to the agent. This risk premium 
is usually interpreted as the loss of controllability of the scheme, which consequently is 
increased.  
 
To carry on the argument for EVA, it is necessary to review in some detail the 
methodology used to generate its standards. This presentation draws from O’Byrne 
(1997), a former partner in S&S (see also O’Byrne and Young, 2006, for a recent article 
that introduces some variants).  
• Start from the formal equality between the discounted value of future residual 
incomes and the discounted value of future cash flows; since the EVA adjustments 
preserve this relationship, and since from standard finance the value of the firm is the 
discounted value of its future cash flows, one gets:  
 
MVA0 = Σn EVAn /(1+wacc)n 
 
in which MVA stands for the excess of market value over invested capital (equity and 
debt claims) and wacc for the weighted average cost of capital  
• EVA0 is known, MVA0  can be measured from the stock price of the company  
• The future benchmarks for the EVAn are defined as increments of  EVAn relative to 
EVAn-1, these increments are called the “expected improvements” and noted EIn  
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• Assume stationary EIn’s for a number of years, and then posit the leveling off 
towards zero, the above relationship can be solved to identify the value for this 
stationary EI 4 
• This procedure generates the standard for next year (the EVA of the current year 
plus EI, the so called expected improvement); this standard setting is unchanged for a 
number of years, the current EVA being plugged in year after year; the whole evaluation 
process (the calculation of the EI through the MVA) is repeated after a number of years.  
 
This method was in use in the early 90s and applied in medium size companies 
operating in stable environments, such as Briggs&Stratton, a primer on EVA 
interviewed by one of the author in 1999 (see methodology section for details). 
 
• In the mid 90’s, S&S developed more elaborate econometric methods based on 
longitudinal analyses at industry level. In this case they talk of "industry curve". For a 
given year k in the past and for a given firm i in the industry a constant preliminary EIik 
is determined using an initial EVAik-1 and the market value added at year k through the 
methodology described earlier  
• This generates a data base (EIik and EVAik-1) over a number of recent years and a 
number of quoted firms in the same sector. A regression is tested between EI and EVA. 
Ordinarily this produces a negative linear relationship which defines the industry curve 
(EI = aEVA +b, in which a and b are two constants and a < 0)  
• Each year n, the actual EIn to be used as the benchmark is obtained from the industry 
curve, i.e. EIn = aEVAn-1 + b.  
 
This method was proposed as a way to extend the previous methodology from stable to 
more cyclical environments.  
 
One may have doubts on the conceptual and operational validity of this methodology to 
set up standards.5 The relationship between MVA and the discounted value of future 
EVA’s is only valid with a perfect financial market, the adopted profile for future 
EVA’s is highly questionable, and the attempts to introduce some form of relative 
performance evaluation through an industry curve accumulates these questionable 
assumptions with potential measurement errors. The way to proceed from this 
“corporate EI” to the EI’s of the “EVA centers” of the firm is not detailed and stands as 
a potential source of problems for implementation, since EVA centers ordinarily are not 
quoted. This provides our second line of investigation for an eventual loss of 
controllability: managers may be subject to targets which contain noisy factors the 
origins of which they neither understand nor control.  
 
Finally, our third line of investigation is related to the actual process that leads from the 
performance measure and the target setting to the actual payment of  the bonus, i.e. the 
negotiation issue. EVA methodology provides very little ability to eliminate 
uncontrollable factors through negotiation.  Greater freedom is available if one has in 
mind the process in the case of internal benchmarks. Merchant (1989) provides an 
                                                 
4 Start from the case of no leveling towards zero, MVA0 = Σn EVAn /(1+wacc)n  = Σn (EVA0 + nEI)/(1+wacc)n 
= EVA0 / wacc  + EI (1+wacc)/ wacc2, which can be solved to get EI. A standard way to make a leveling towards 
zero is to assume that after some year N, EVAn is constant. The corresponding EI can be computed accordingly. 
5 Bromwich (1973) points out a potential flaw in using the present value of future cash flows for setting 
standards, it introduces a closed loop between the future cash flows and the standard, the quality of management 
cannot be rewarded since it is expected. This comment applies as well to the SIT adjustment (section 4.3.). 
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insightful discussion of such negotiations. The budget is usually a bottom up 
construction based on explicit environmental factors (demand volumes, input and output 
prices, corporate agreement on a specific investment project…). This allows for a 
sensitivity analysis which provides an objective playing field for ex-ante and ex-post 
negotiations. This is impossible with EVA because of the “black box” methodology 
used to generate its external benchmarks. 
 
2.3. The research hypotheses 
 
Ideally, best compensation schemes should be both congruent and controllable. As a 
matter of fact, it seems difficult to design a scheme that optimally combines both 
dimensions (Feltham and Xie, 1994, Datar et al, 2001). Many compensation schemes 
encountered in practice favor one dimension or the other. Baker (2002) illustrates the 
tradeoff and discusses the pitfalls for neglecting this fact: for example focusing on cost 
(easily controllable) while neglecting quality (important for congruity but harder to 
control), and focusing on short term measures (easily controllable) while neglecting long 
term ones (more congruent but harder to control), etc. Ittner et al. (2003) provide 
evidence on the difficulties to properly balance multiple measures.  
 
The preceding discussion suggests that EVA may be viewed as favoring congruity over 
controllability. Our hypotheses can then be summarized as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The introduction of EVA schemes induces a loss of controllability relative 
to more traditional compensation schemes.  
 
Assuming that this hypothesis is validated, three possible explanations are put forward 
for further testing.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The loss of controllability comes from the introduction of internal and/or 
external noisy factors in the performance measure.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The loss of controllability comes from the introduction of unpredictable 
factors by external target setting. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The loss of controllability comes from the absence of renegotiation that 
determines the actual bonus from the performance measure and the target. 
 
The clarification of these various hypotheses should cast some light on the reasons for 
introducing EVA and on its relative decline. The following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Given the confirmation of hypothesis 1, if the top management is to keep 
EVA for congruity reasons, it will address the controllability issues either  
• by revising the EVA scheme (to introduce more controllability) 
• or by keeping the EVA scheme but reducing its weight in the global compensation 
scheme (so as to introduce other more “controllable” components).  
 
3.   Research methodology 
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The longitudinal study took place between 1999 and 2006. This section reviews the 
interactions the authors had with the company, where the data come from, who has been 
interviewed and what the questions were. 
 
Several interactions with the company XYZ took place over the period. In 1999, 
Ponssard (in collaboration with the EVA project leader at XYZ), made a survey of the 
implementations of value based management as a consulting job for XYZ. A dozen 
companies in the US and in Europe were identified as “EVA companies”. Typically the 
H&R and the Finance managers in these companies were interviewed for a couple of 
hours. The questions covered the following topics: why and how was EVA 
implemented, what was the involvement of the top management, what were the main 
adjustments, what was the target setting process,  how far down the organization were 
EVA centers defined, what assessments could be made about the benefits and pitfalls of 
the implementation. An independent research project used that survey as a starting point 
to provide a taxonomy of implementations of value based management (Mottis and 
Ponssard, 2001-2002). 
 
In 2002, Larmande and Ponssard worked on a consulting assignment for XYZ. The 
objective was to provide an assessment of  the first three years of operations of the EVA 
compensation plan. Information was collected regarding the specifics of the plan 
implemented at XYZ and on the motivation for these characteristics. A hard (“archival”) 
data base was constructed on the actual performance measures used for all the EVA 
centers of the company, their calibration with respect to bonuses and the bonuses that 
were indeed paid in 2000, 2001 and 2002. Exceptions to the general formula were 
identified and analyzed. Systematic interviews were carried on with the heads of the 
four divisional HR departments. Each interview would typically go on for two hours and 
be based on an in depth discussion of the actual outcomes for the division and of its 
BU’s using the data base. Preliminary conclusions were discussed with the head of 
corporate control, the manager that had been in charge of the EVA project and some 
senior executives.   
 
Our analysis of the EVA compensation scheme over 2000, 2001 and 2002 pointed out 
some important deficiencies. Based on this assessment, our role was not to advocate for 
precise recommendations but to simulate various proposals discussed at the top 
management level, using the data base that had been constructed.   
 
In 2006, an in depth interview with a senior H&R executive was made to have his 
analysis of the changes made on 2003. Further changes that had been implemented in 
2006 were also discussed. We obtained access to the company EVA data base, that now 
included the years 2003, 2004 and 2005, for research purposes.   
 
This research project is unusual from a methodological point of view. We do not start 
from well stated research questions and go in the field to test them. In a way we 
observed the implementation of a compensation scheme over a long period of time and 
we use contract theory to interpret the findings that seem to emerge. In our opinion, the 
fact that these findings primarily come from hard data and that we had no vested interest 
in advocating for or against the actual incentive schemes being implemented make the 
discussion fairly objective. 
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The informational content of this article has been cleared by XYZ as far as 
confidentiality is concerned. The interpretation of the results remains our sole 
responsibility.   
 
4. The longitudinal study (XYZ 2000-2006) 
 
4.1. The context 
 
In 2000 XYZ operated in over 70 countries with a 12 billion dollar turnover and 65,000 
employees. In 2005, the turnover had grown to around 20 billion dollar mostly through 
acquisitions. 
 
The activity of XYZ is in the construction material business. This business has two 
important economic characteristics: (i) high capital intensity, due to high investment 
costs relative to annual input costs (ii) high delivery costs of its products relative to their 
prices. XYZ’s organizational structure reflects these two characteristics: it is a collection 
of investment centers (to be referred as business units and abbreviated as BU) managed 
through four divisions corresponding to four major lines of business. In 2001 it had 
around 60 BU’s and  more than 100 in 2005. Note for further discussion that the 
divisions are unequal in size, revenue and profit. One division may be called the core 
business of the company.  
 
The decentralized structure makes the business quite different from global ones such as 
telecoms or pharmaceuticals in which many decisions are centralized. In XYZ local 
managers have a large spectrum of responsibility. Business units are in charge of 
operational decisions, including pricing, product mix, operating costs and maintenance. 
They have the responsibility of generating profits on a given set of assets operating over 
a given geographic area. However they may not control all capital expenditures relative 
to their investment center: very large capital investment projects such as plant 
restructuring and acquisitions or divestitures are made at the divisional level or even at 
the corporate level, depending on their magnitude.  
 
During the 1990s several initiatives were taken to introduce the concept of "value 
creation". Reports on investment choices had to show value created more explicitly. 
Analyses of net discounted value had to be quantified in relation to key performance 
indicators that could be updated. Acquisitions had to explain the associated synergies 
and economies. But most of these cases involved only a handful of senior executives in 
each division, and most of the capital expenditures were still determined by 
organizational routines. At operational level attention remained focused on the income 
statement. 
 
The top management decided that another way had to be found to mobilize all members 
of the executive committees of all business units, i.e. about 1,000 to 1,200 managers in 
2000, around the notion of value creation. The EVA approach, based on a new 
performance measure combined with a radical change in the compensation system, 
appeared as an appropriate way to achieve this goal. The decision to adopt it was taken 
in 1998. In 2000 the new compensation system had been established and gradually 
applied throughout the firm. The system was revised in 2003 and again in 2006.  
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The next sections describe the successive compensation plans starting from what was in 
place prior to 2000.  
 
4.2. The variable compensation system before 2000 
 
Before the year 2000 several variable compensation schemes existed in the XYZ Group. 
The information is scattered in the divisions. Practice depended on the product line and 
on the country.  
• the performance indicator on which the bonus was calculated was EBITDA or EBIT, 
or exceptionally ROCE; in some countries there were no individual variable bonus 
• standards (targets) were determined internally, BU by BU  
• this determination of the standard consisted in a negotiation between the head of the 
BU and her/his superior (division manager), that took into account the current year's 
budget and the previous year's result  
• the calibration could be linear or not linear but always included caps and floors 
• this “financial” component regarding the performance of the BU was then integrated 
into a larger assessment of indicators which involved personal objectives associated to 
each BU manager  
• though the bonus could theoretically vary on a scale from 0% to 100%, 50% being the 
fair bonus, the observed bonus would usually be established at between 65% and 85%. 
 
4.3. The initial compensation plan: 2000-2002 
 
The approach followed the general S&S framework as summarized in section 2: the four 
steps identified by O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) and the target setting process detailed 
in O’Byrne (1997). The main differences will be emphasized. 
 
 (i) Defining the EVA performance measure for each BU  
 
The general idea was to push the EVA performance measure as far down the 
organization as possible: the Group level, the four divisions, the BU’s. The case study 
focuses on the BU level. 
 
The economic characteristics of the business make it fairly easy to break down the 
NOPAT  in full and the capital employed from the company level to divisional and then 
business unit levels. The cost of capital is defined at the corporate level and this cost 
taken identical all through the company. This allows the computation of the residual 
income (RI) for all BU’s. 
 
From this RI measure, two adjustments were made to define EVA. An “economic 
adjusted asset” value was preferred to the book value to reflect the market value of the 
BU. For a recently acquired business, the economic adjusted asset is the acquisition 
price (including goodwill); for older BU’s, value judgments were made at the corporate 
level. According to the EVA project leader, the main reason for this adjustment was to 
avoid highly positive EVA for older assets and low or negative EVA for recent assets. 
Such accounting distortions would otherwise trigger unfair internal value judgments. 
The adjustment was not made for portfolio analysis purposes. 
 
The other adjustment concerned a “strategic investment treatment” (SIT), as 
recommended by Stern and Stewart’s methodology. Given that certain major 
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investments in the firm can have deferred returns and in order not to discourage this type 
of investment through the bonus scheme, the negative EVA’s of the first years (e.g. for 
three years), as forecasted in the business plan, are capitalized and charged uniformly 
over time later in the future. Over the next three years, only the gap between the 
observed EVA and the expected EVA in the business plan will impact the bonus.6 Only 
large investments would be eligible for a SIT. 
 
All the EVA calculations for a business unit, whatever its geographical location, would 
take place in the currency used by XYZ for its financial statements. This is important 
since many BU’s have their reporting statements in local currencies. The reason for this 
is to encourage the BU’s to be accountable for capital employed in the currency used to 
get the funds. 
 
(ii) Calibration: the standard and the strength of the bonus scheme  
 
From the EVA indicators, the following yearly performance indexes (PI) were 
constructed at all levels of the organization: 
 
PI = 1 + (this year EVA – previous year EVA – EI)/Interval EVA 
 
A PI of 100% is to be interpreted as a fair bonus (50% of the maximal bonus), it means 
that the target (previous year EVA  + EI) is achieved. Achieving the target and the 
Interval EVA gets a PI of 200% (presumably an outstanding performance) while 
achieving the target minus the Interval EVA gets a PI of 0% (presumably a poor 
performance). By calibrating the Interval EVA one can calibrate the “strength” of the 
bonus scheme. The selection of the intervals were considered to be the responsibility of 
the divisions, they were determined by taking into account the business units projected 
results and the subjective appreciation of their volatility.  
 
The target setting to obtain the EI was as follows:  
• The industry curve was used to set the EI at the group level in 2000  
• The EI at the group level was first broken down on each division, then within each 
division on each BU, so that the sum of EIs at each level (BU or divisions) would equal 
the EI at the higher level (divisions or group, respectively). In this cascading down 
process two considerations were used. First, the estimated industry curve was applied 
mechanically at each disaggregated level. Second, these initial EI proposals were 
submitted to BU managers and compared to their respective strategic five-year plans. 
Since most of these EIs would lead to lower projections than the internal forecast, they 
were seldom challenged 
• It was decided that these EI’s, as calculated by the above process, would remain 
constant over the next three years and then would be updated. 
 
(iii) The bonus scheme: annual and multi-year bonuses 
 
                                                 
6 As an example, take an investment CE that has a positive NPV but that generates no NOPAT over the next 
three years. To encourage the BU manager to make that investment, the first three years projected EVA’s 
resulting from the investment, i.e. – waccCE, are capitalized as if the investment started in year 3 and excluded 
from the BU EVA calculation. Then only the differences in NOPAT and in CE (as long as they differ from the 
planned ones) matter for bonus purposes at year 1 to 3. 
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From the performance indexes two bonuses were determined for each organizational 
level: a yearly bonus and a three year bonus to be paid over the period 2000-2001-2002. 
 
The yearly bonus is zero if the PI is less or equal to 0%, linear from 0% to 200% and 
constant over 200%. This is a standard system with cap and floor.  
 
The three-year bonus is also a cap and floor system: (i) the average value of the three 
PI’s, one for each year, is computed, (ii) the floor is at 100% while the cap remains at 
200%. The three year bonus is more challenging than the annual one. According to the 
EVA project manager, this approach was preferred to a bonus bank to allow managers to 
obtain a positive yearly bonus whatever their past results would be. With a bonus bank, 
it may take several years to overcome an exceptionally bad year. 
 
The size of the variable fair annual bonus (roughly between 12% and 30% of the basic 
salary, depending on the level of responsibility) was harmonized throughout the group. 
Half of this annual bonus was to depend automatically on the EVA. The other half was 
determined in relation to quantified personal objectives, this part remained to be 
monitored at the decentralized hierarchical level.  
 
On top of these two components, the three-year bonus was to be considered as an 
exceptional bonus for outstanding performance, it would only applied to managers high 
enough in the organizational ranking.  
 
A manager who belongs to the executive committee of a BU would typically get the 
yearly EVA bonus of his or her unit. The manager in charge of the BU would get a EVA 
bonus calculated as two thirds on the results of his or her unit and one-third on the 
results of the division to which this BU is affiliated. Depending on their ranking, he or 
she may also get the three year EVA bonus. 
 
At the divisional level, the same procedure applies. The managers at the corporate level 
have EVA bonuses that only depend on the results of the company as such. 
 
The performance measure process (keeping track of EVA calculations, of the 
adjustments, introducing further standard adjustments for change in scope, computing 
the PI’s, …) was administered by the corporate control department. The human 
resources departments of each division would determine the actual individual EVA 
bonuses from the PI’s.  
 
 
 
4.4. The updated plan: 2003-2005 
 
The main changes implemented from 2003 concerned three aspects of the compensation 
plan. 
 
(i) The EVA calculations 
 
A number of simplifications were introduced. The calculations of NOPAT would omit 
exceptional non recurring items. A direct change in the EI was substituted for the SIT 
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adjustment.7  The impact of currency changes was simplified and no longer followed the 
detailed accounting treatments for such matters. At the BU level, local currency would 
be used for lower level managers eligible for EVA bonuses. The corporate level 
provided a reassessment of the “economic adjusted assets” for each BU. 
 
(ii) The Expected Improvements and the Intervals 
 
An internal note issued by the top management to motivate the changes says: “We keep 
the basic principle of a financial bonus tied to actual EVA variation, compared with an 
“external” target not related to budget. The second half of the bonus, tied to personal 
objectives, ensures that the quality of efforts made is rewarded, even if the environment 
has been so tough that financial results have not been achieved.”  
 
This is an important statement put forward by the top management, it clearly advocates 
that the main objective for the EVA system at XYZ is to make managers aware of the 
financial “objective” performance of the company at all levels. It was not announced so 
clearly to the organization in 2000.  
  
However, a certain margin of flexibility in the objective-setting mechanism to recognize 
specially difficult situations was introduced in 2003. Firstly, external standards for 
expected improvements would be set each year for the following year (while in the 
initial plan the same EI were to be used for three years). The reference to the “industry 
curve” approach is abandoned and replaced by a simple principle: (i) a BU with negative 
EVA must be able to go back to positive EVA in k years, (ii) a BU with a positive EVA 
must generate at least some percentage m of capital employed, which means the return 
on capital is expected to increase by this percentage.8 Secondly, the actual EI may differ 
from this external standard,9 the divisions can modulate them to recognize different 
situations in their different BU’s, provided the sum of their units EI’s corresponds at 
least to the division EI. Thirdly, a simple consistency check with market expectations is 
done at the group level, without further reference to an industry curve. 
 
The Intervals were enlarged to better reflect the relative volatility of the environment for 
each type of business. Globally, the target spread given by the corporate to each division 
was that approximately 2/3 of BU’s should be in the linear part of the bonus range with 
1/6 at no bonus and 1/6 at maximal bonus.  
 
The three year bonus was changed to a revolving long term bonus paid each year but 
based on the average of the PI’s obtained in the last three years. Yet, this bonus 
remained more demanding as the yearly bonus with a floor set at 100% and not at 0%.  
 
4.5. Further changes: the compensation plan 2006 onwards 
 
In 2005 EVA had still not gained full acceptability on part of many operational 
managers. An internal study was made to test the feasibility to base part of the bonus on 
a variance analysis of EVA putting on one side external factors (demand volumes, input 
prices…) while keeping for internal evaluation factors such as market shares, output 
                                                 
7 Using the same example as in footnote 7 this would amount to subtract waccCE in the EI of the corresponding 
BU for the next three years. 
8 The exact figures for k and the increase in return on capital are confidential. 
9 Such a standard is external in the sense that no specifics of the BU are used to set the target.  
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prices, productivity… Several controllers at the divisional level made detailed proposals 
on how to implement such analyses.  
 
The top management refused to pursue this avenue for several reasons. A number of 
BU’s did not have the information systems to carry on such analyses. It was not clear 
that operational managers could or would make sense of such detailed and sometimes 
quite sophisticated analyses in their decision making. More importantly, in a number of 
cases it appeared clearly that these analyses would explain poor financial performance 
by external factors and good financial performance by internal ones, resulting in high 
bonuses at all times.    
 
The top management recognized that the level of external variability in the EVA bonus 
was too high and decided to put on the following changes:  
- the long term bonus was abandoned all together 
- it was replaced by a “collective performance” bonus based on two parts: 
 a performance indicator of company XYZ relative to its peers, this indicator 
uniformly applies to all managers whatever their BU or division 
 a key performance indicator specific to each division to be spread down to all 
its BU’s reflecting business priorities (innovation, cash flows, safety…) ; the BU 
indicators may slightly differ within each division. 
 
From 2006 onwards, the compensation system at XYZ contains three components: 
- 1/3 based on the yearly annual increase in EVA as defined in the 2003 plan 
- 1/3 based on the newly adopted collective performance measures 
- 1/3 based on traditional personal objectives.  
 
5. Analysis of the case study 
 
We now analyze this case study with respect to the research hypotheses stated in section 
2.3.  
- Are the bonuses generated by EVA objectively more volatile than the previous type of 
bonuses previously in the organization?  
- Do the managers perceived this volatility as a general loss of their controllability? 
- Is it possible to relate this subjective loss to the factors identified: the performance 
measurement, the target setting and/or the absence of renegotiation?    
 
5.1. The initial plan: the loss of controllability (hypothesis 1) is validated 
 
Consider first the actual bonuses paid over the first years of operations of the 
compensation plan. Table 1 displays the pay-outs associated to all BU’s in company 
XYZ. The classification gives the percentage of zero bonus (floor), intermediate bonus 
(on the linear range) and maximal bonus (cap) for the successive years as well as the 
three year bonus paid in 2002 and relative to 2000-2001-2002.  
 
The most striking feature is the spread of the PI’s. Take year 2000: 26% of the BU’s get 
a zero EVA annual bonus reflecting a poor performance while 39% of the BU’s get the 
maximal EVA annual bonus (twice the fair bonus). From the record available in the 
company that had never been observed. Most managers had experienced a system of 
bonus in which they would always get some positive bonus, the range going from 65% 
to 85% of the maximal bonus! If one expects to get a bonus in the range of 65% to 85% 
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of the maximal bonus and one gets 0% (say with probability 26/100) and 100% (say 
with probability 39/100), the feeling is that the system is intrinsically more volatile. But 
this can mean two things: either the system is badly calibrated (the Intervals are too 
large) or, if you expect 85% based on the perception of your effort and you finally get 
0%, the controllability of the new scheme may be at stake. Moreover, table 1 says 
nothing as regards the volatility from one year to the next one (the probability of getting 
say a large bonus in year 2001 given the bonus obtained in year 2000), except that the 
(unconditional) spread remains large. Volatility may thus be a problem only for the first 
year or for every year. These three issues remained implicit in the company. The top 
management had committed itself, the EVA plan went on without changes for three 
years. Only after that time period an in depth analysis was to be carried on.  
 
% of BUs classification Yearly Bonus Three year Bonus
bonus max 39%
2000 intermediate 35%
no bonus 26%
bonus max 32%
2001 intermediate 29%
no bonus 39%
bonus max 27% 23%
2002 intermediate 45% 30%
no bonus 28% 47%
All BU's
 
Table 1: the spread of bonuses for the initial plan 
 
Here are the comments collected in the 2002 interviews. These comments suggest that 
the managers perceived a loss of their controllability on the EVA performance measure 
relative to the traditional internal measures they were used to: 
- The large spread of the bonuses observed in the first year was imputed to the volatility 
of the EVA performance measure as such 
- This volatility was itself imputed primarily to external economic conditions (in some 
cases, a simple variance analysis was put forward to advocate this view). The new 
system thus seemed to reward results more than managers' efforts, as opposed to their 
past experience. In certain extreme cases managers felt that it was simply a question of 
the luck of the draw. Of course, managers with high bonuses did not complain about the 
system 
- From the second and third year of application of the system, several units complained 
that even before the beginning of the year, all hope of a bonus seemed inaccessible when 
they compared their budget with the "standard" fixed one or two years earlier. In their 
opinion the bonus system had lost much of its relevance due to the change of context. 
They considered that certain BU’s were simply "carried" by their environment, 
something that seemed unfair and caused them to question the rationale of the system 
- In some instances managers would be reluctant to accept internal mobility proposals 
from the perspective of losing a high predictable bonus  
- The time dependence of the bonuses was indeed checked for some of these units while 
the time volatility appeared as the general rule 
- The origin of the largest observed volatilities (i.e. the lowest PI’s) somewhat differed, 
depending on whether the BU belonged to the firm for some time or to entities that had 
recently been acquired. In the former case, unexpected moves by competitors were put 
forward as an environmental factor that made the initial standard totally obsolete. In the 
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latter case, the price paid for the acquisition, to which the managers in charge were not 
responsible, was considered as imposing unrealistic capital charges for their BU.  
 
To remedy this situation, but only in extreme cases, the top management had decided to 
"neutralize" the bonus system of certain BU’s. This neutralization operated as follows: 
(i) an ex-post re-evaluation of the bonus parameters so that the BU obtained the fair 
bonus anyway, (ii) the elimination of the BU in the calculations of the bonus for the 
division, so that the divisional managers would not be penalized by a unit whose results 
were too bad. 
 
The volatility of the bonus payments, the answers to the interviews and the reaction of 
the top management (the ex-post neutralization of extreme cases and the internal note 
diffused within the company, see ii) in section in 4.4) altogether validate hypothesis 1: 
the perceived loss of controllability. Volatility alone would not mean much, otherwise a 
multiplication by 2 of a performance measure would lead to a loss of controllability, 
which it clearly does not, a proper calibration of the bonus scheme would eliminate this 
kind of volatility. In the case study, the Intervals were indeed not selected carefully 
enough to avoid this calibration problem. Yet, the detailed answers of the managers 
prove that there is something more. Then the successive plans demonstrate that 
controllability remained a rampant subject of concern that had to be mitigated. 
  
5.2. Explaining this loss of controllability with the initial plan: hypotheses 2 and 3 may 
have some bite 
 
Can one relate the loss of controllability as perceived by the managers to the objective 
factors envisaged in section 2.  Consider first the EVA measure as such. 
- some components regarding the treatment of exceptional items in the NOPAT may be 
less predictable than in an EBIT discussed internally without the rigor of accounting 
rules as seemed to be the case in XYZ  
- Some managers insisted on the unpredictability of exchange rates and on the arbitrary 
rules associated with some accounting operations such as the treatment of pensions.  
 
These are valid reasons for some loss of controllability, but their relevance should be 
limited to some BU’s (exchange rates) and can be easily corrected (pensions). 
 
Consider now the impact of the external target setting. This factor is directly connected 
to some of the comments made by the managers. Their arguments amount to this: “given 
the cap and floor structure of the bonus, if from the very start the objective is too 
stretched (the EI is too high), I have no way to get a fair bonus”. This means that the 
bonus scheme is out of the control of the manager in the following sense: there is no 
way to get some bonus through the effort deployed. As reported by the H&R managers, 
the vast majority of operational managers recommended to revert to an internal standard 
in which the EI would be set with reference to the budget.  
 
To objectively test whether the target setting is responsible for the loss of control as 
defined above we have computed what the performance indexes would have been for 
year 2002, had the budget been used as target instead of using the external EI. To be 
precise, let EVA0 be the current year EVA and B1 be the budget of the BU for next year. 
From this budget one can infer a forecasted EVA for the coming year EVA1B. Define the 
expected improvement derived from the budget as EI1B = EVA1B – EVA0. Making one’s 
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budget would generate a PI of 100% if EI1B had been used as a target instead of using 
the actual EI. 
 
(insert graph 1 about here) 
 
Graph 1 displays the differences between the two PI’s, the actual one in the x axis and 
the budget one in the y axis. A point on the diagonal means that the two coincide. It can 
be observed that there are almost no correlation between internal (budget based) and 
external (EI based) PI (the R2 coefficient is .241). As long as making one’s budget 
means something to a manager, and generally it does, the actual EVA bonus has no 
relationship with this sense of satisfaction. This suggests that the change is indeed 
drastic and may very well be the main factor for the perceived loss of controllability.  
  
5.3. The second plan (2003-2005): hypothesis 1 remains valid and it is shown that 
hypotheses 2 and 3 have little bite after all  
 
Consider now the changes introduced in 2003. They enlarge the Intervals to take 
account of the volatility of the EVA performance measure, simplify the adjustments and 
allow for some flexibility in the target setting process (while keeping an external 
standard). 
 
The first change should get rid of the eventual calibration problem. The second change 
reduces the eventual impact of external noise explicitly due to the difference between 
EVA and traditional accounting measures.  
 
The volatility of bonuses declined but, in spite of these changes, the volatility remains 
high relative what is usually obtained with traditional bonus schemes (see table 2). The 
subjective perception of the loss of controllability persists among managers as 
confirmed by the 2006 interviews and the further changes that occurred at that time.  
 
% of BUs classification Yearly Bonus Three year Bonus
bonus max 18% 18%
2003 intermediate 61% 38%
no bonus 21% 45%
bonus max 19% 13%
2004 intermediate 60% 39%
no bonus 21% 48%
bonus max 21% 11%
2005 intermediate 55% 31%
no bonus 24% 58%
All BU's
 
 
Table 2: the spread of bonuses for the second plan 
 
The 2005 results are now used to test whether the new target setting generates targets 
that are closer to the ones obtained from the budget. The results are displayed in graph 2. 
The alignment on the diagonal is striking, as compared to graph 1. This means that the 
two target setting, both the internal and the external one, give similar targets. The R2 
coefficient is now .60, which is quite significant. Yet the external standard plays a 
dominant role: graph 3 depicts the actual PI relative to what it would have been had the 
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simple formula been used.10  The R2 coefficient climbs to .93 so that one can infer that 
the adjustments towards the budget remain minimal. 
 
(insert graphs 2 and 3 about here) 
 
This analysis can be made more precise through a multifactor regression analysis in 
which the actual PI is explained through the PI in which the simple formula is used as a 
target and the PI in which it is the budget which is used. The regression is highly 
significant and both factors are as well. However the coefficient of the formula based PI 
is much larger (.827) than the one coming form the budget (.138). This proves that the 
actual target setting is closer to the external one (formula based) than internal (budget 
based). These results are displayed in table 3.  
 
 
All BU's 2005 R-squared 0.94 Number of ob 118
Observed PI
Regression Coeff. Signif
PI_budget .138 0.000
PI_formula .827 0.000
Constant -1.5 0.732
 
Table 3: the regression of observed PI with respect to budget and formula for all BU’s 
   
How can one explain that the observed EI moves from the external standard towards the 
budget EI? Two explanations are to be considered: (i) the budget process itself is 
strongly influenced by the external target, (ii) the divisional managers use the flexibility 
offered by the new target setting to adjust the external standards to the environmental 
specificities of the BU’s, specificities which are already embedded in the budget. The 
second explanation seems more plausible. The budget is made in November of the 
previous year while the target setting is made in March of the current year, once the 
actual EVA of the previous year is definitely known. This timing rules out the 
assumption (i). Our explanation is that assumption (ii) holds: the adjustment goes in the 
direction of the budget (and of the current year results observed through the first quarter) 
but the external standard remains a strong anchoring target.  
 
Since the two standards are close to each other, and since the intervals are now more 
meaningfully calibrated, the relative spreads in bonuses would have been similar with an 
internal standard based on budget as with EVA (table 4). In terms of mean values and 
standard deviations, the two series are statistically not distinguishable.  
  
All BU's 2005 Observed PI Budget as EI
mean value 91% 87%
st deviation 1,79 1,72
 
 
Table 4: comparisons of the spreads obtained with the actual EI and with budget 
  
                                                 
10 EI = Max ( -EVA n-1 / k; m EVA n-1), see ii) in section 4.4. 
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It is interesting to run this analysis only for the BU’s which belong to the core business 
of company XYZ. One would expect that the corresponding managers have more power 
relative to corporate than those of non core BU’s. Does this mean that they can influence 
the target setting to their own benefit? The regression of the actual PI with respect to PI 
in which the simple formula is used as a target and the PI in which it is the budget which 
is used is again highly significant but the relative weights are different (see table 5). In 
this case, the actual target setting appears almost equally balanced between the external 
(.506) and internal setting (.484). The managers of the BU’s in the core business of XYZ 
have indeed more power to draw the target towards budget. To some extent, this 
materializes through higher bonuses (see table 6 for the 2005 bonuses of core versus non 
core BU’s). 
Core BU's 2005 R-squared 0.98 Number of ob 45
Observed PI
Regression Coeff. Signif
PI_budget .484 0.000
PI_formula .506 0.000
Constant 3.07 0.43
 
Table 5: the regression of observed PI for the core business BU’s 
   
% of BUs classification 45 core BU's 73 non core BU's
bonus max 27% 18%
2005 intermediate 62% 51%
no bonus 11% 32%
 
Table 6: the actual bonuses for the core versus non core BU’s in 2005 
 
 
5.4. Putting everything together: the non-controllability comes from the lack of 
renegotiation (hypothesis 4)  
 
At this point, we have a system based on a performance measure: (i) that is not much 
noisier than previous measures used in the company (thanks in particular to the changes 
made in EVA calculations), (ii) in which some limited negotiation can take place ex-
ante at the target setting phase, (iii) but in which no ex-post renegotiation is feasible. A 
loss of controllability is perceived, significant enough to induce further search for a 
better scheme. We discuss the resilience on the loss of controllability and then comment 
on the adopted plan.  
 
In our opinion the loss of controllability mainly comes from the lack of renegotiation. 
The fact that EVA is conceptually associated to market expectations and that it is 
administered through a heavy accounting process by the control department, reduces the 
flexibility for operational managers to make the appropriate ex-post adjustments to 
eliminate relevant out of control environmental factors. Comments regarding the system 
prior to 2000 are illustrative of the difference “budget was made under this and this 
assumption, ex-post let us recalculate the true reference to assess the bonus”. Such 
adjustments cannot be made with an external standard. The limited changes available 
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ex-post, such as the neutralization reported in section 4.3, exemplify the unsatisfactory 
process to face extreme situations with an EVA scheme. 
 
Is it possible to eliminate this drawback through an ex-post variance analysis? The route 
followed in the case study is illustrative of the usual pitfalls encountered with variance 
analysis. Testing in XYZ showed that these variances analyses may become a 
complicated scheme in the hands of the controller, may have no managerial relevance, 
may be manipulated to explain that poor performance is due to the environment and 
good performance to wise decisions. The limited range of bonuses observed previously 
was precisely attributed by the top management to such renegotiations based on such 
informal variance analyses. The lack of confidence of the top management in the 
objectivity of the past internal process, with its gaming around budget and the informal 
renegotiation that goes with it, had triggered the adoption of a more “objective” system 
based on an external standard. It seems fair to conclude that the subjective 
controllability of the earlier system perceived by the managers comes partly from their 
past ability to manipulate the internal standard to obtain (large) predictable bonuses. No 
wonder that the route followed to eliminate the loss of controllability through a variance 
analysis appeared as a dead end.11
 
The changes made in 2006 may be seen as indirect evidence that in spite of the changes 
made in 2003 EVA still induces a lack of controllability detrimental to its acceptability 
by operational managers. To remedy this drawback the route that was followed is in line 
with hypothesis 5 part 2: a reduction in the weight of EVA in the total scheme and the 
introduction of other more “controllable” performance measures. More precisely, the 
more uncontrollable part, i.e. the long term EVA bonus, was abandoned and replaced by 
more traditional performance indicators constructed either on benchmarks relative to 
peers and on internal standards.  
 
6. Discussion: explaining the decline of EVA 
 
This concluding section reviews the results of the case study in a broader perspective, in 
particular as a contribution to an understanding of the emergence and relative decline of 
EVA.   
 
6.1. Is EVA efficient after all: a question that remains open 
 
A question that often comes to mind and is not addressed in the paper is the eventual 
better performance obtained at XYZ through the introduction of EVA. This question 
cannot be answered easily. The case study does not overcome this difficulty.  
 
The stock price of XYZ did not outperformed the index of the sector over the 2000-2006 
period. Observe however that such evidence would have left open the role of many other 
factors such as the impact of geographic and product differences in the portfolio of firms 
as well as changes (through acquisitions or divestitures) in these portfolios. Empirical 
studies such as Mottis and Ponssard (2001-2002) point out that the introduction of EVA 
often coincides with the change of CEO and the adoption of a turnaround in strategy, 
two things which did not occurred in XYZ, as well as many differences from firm to 
                                                 
11 This can be demonstrated in a formal model (Larmande and Ponssard, 2007). The sophisticated variance 
analysis, when the manager is privately informed and consequently can mitigate the impact of the uncertain 
environmental factor, does not eliminate this factor from the performance measure.  
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firm in implementing EVA (Malmi and Ikäheimo, 2003). Such factors may be more 
decisive in explaining  changes  in stock prices than compensation plans as such (see for 
instance Dial and Murphy, 1995, for an analysis in which many such factors are closely 
intertwined). This sheds some doubts on the interpretations of the correlations discussed 
in Wallace (1997) and Kleiman (1999).  
 
A better focused analysis could concentrate on the evolution of investment and 
maintenance expenses at the BU level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that operational 
managers got into the habit of analyzing their balance sheet and no longer only their 
income statement, and managed their assets more efficiently, at least the part over which 
they had real decision-making powers. This enhanced analytical capability applied 
mainly to strategic reviews and budgets. For monthly control, on the other hand, EVA 
calculations required precise accounting data that were available too late, so that control 
continued to be based on EBIT. Quantitative assessments of these changes are not 
available due to the absence of consistent historical data on BU’s due to frequent 
changes in perimeters. 
 
6.2. The results at XYZ are in line with contract theory 
 
Compensation schemes are analyzed through the congruity/controllability grid. The 
EVA scheme implemented at XYZ suffers from a lack of controllability. Firstly, EVA 
calculations cannot completely eliminate complex and arbitrary accounting treatments 
which introduce an internal administrative noise in the process. Secondly, the way 
targets are set within the organizational structure introduces further volatility. Thirdly, 
and more importantly, the external process for setting target excludes (re)negotiation. 
The very idea to use an external standard in order to dissociate the target definition from 
the budget process, as suggested in Jensen (2001), generates standards down the 
organization which may not be understood by the operational managers and that cannot 
be readjusted in face of uncontrollable events through either ex-ante or ex-post 
negotiation. The successive EVA plans implemented at XYZ over the period 2000-2006 
mitigated the first two drawbacks but not the third one.  
 
The overall trend observed at XYZ is one of a relative decline in the use of EVA. This is 
consistent with contract theory: highly uncontrollable performance measures should be 
replaced by more controllable ones. The fact that XYZ kept EVA along with these other 
measures can clearly be interpreted as a way to preserve congruity with the stock 
market. The top management repeatedly recalled that operational managers at the BU 
level should be made aware of the performance of their unit as seen by the financial 
community and that EVA was the appropriate measure for that. Altogether the scheme 
in 2006 illustrates a pragmatic balance between congruity and controllability. 
 
6.3. To what extent are the conclusions case specific? 
 
Company XYZ qualifies as a good representative of what is meant by “EVA 
companies” as coined by Stern&Stewart. The reliance on accounting data, the 
introduction of adjustments, the use of external standards, the use of a long term 
perspective for the bonus, all these features have been implemented at XYZ. 
 
Observations coming from other companies conform with the conclusions of the case 
study, even if the actual outcomes may be somehow different. As in Lovata and 
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Costigan (2002) or in Riceman et al. (2002) external financial pressure appears as the 
main reason for adopting EVA. The ATT story as reported in Ittner et al. (1998) is 
illustrative of controllability issues. The commitment to a “pure” EVA scheme was 
quickly followed by the introduction of measures of customer and employee satisfaction 
that we interpret as a way to enhance controllability. Technical difficulties appeared: the 
fact that the EI’s and the Intervals are absolute numbers made updating tedious in face 
of numerous structural changes. This reduced the adhesion of managers to an indicator 
which was complex to follow, again a controllability issue. On top of that, the 
disconnection that appeared between EVA and MVA made the congruity questionable 
to the shareholders, which led to a change in CEO. 
 
6.4. Other interpretations for the decline of EVA? 
 
Two other sources of explanation may be worth exploring further. Compensation may 
also be analyzed through indirect views such as fairness, a way to provide a sense of 
being good, of being a member of the company… (Merchant, 1989). In this respect it 
may be considered as extremely difficult to sustain a bonus scheme with such large 
spreads as the ones encountered with EVA in XYZ. Recall that the scheme previously in 
place resulted in bonus payments in the range of 65 % to 85% . Many managers resented 
very badly a zero bonus, which sometimes occurred twice in a row. To attribute this 
bonus to environmental factors is a way to avoid cognitive dissonance. To press for a 
change of the system is a way to encourage bonus schemes that would be more 
comfortable to live with.  
 
The other consideration may come from the relationship between management control 
systems and compensation. Simons (1995) introduces major differences between 
diagnostic and interactive control systems. One could argue that EVA fits well with 
diagnostic systems: it is objectively defined and based on external benchmarks, it is 
quite adequate for remote control. The adoption of EVA would coincide with the need 
to show that Wall Street pressure is taken seriously by the top management. But it can 
be argued that EVA is inadequate to promote change within a company through an 
interactive involvement of top managers, more subjective performance measures are 
needed to accompany specific goals and create a learning attitude. The pretence of EVA 
to be the unique performance measure that is needed generates a contradiction and 
triggers the questioning of its incentive value even at the top management level. The fact 
that EVA has never been adopted by financial analysts further explain the decline.  
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Graph 1: The 2002 performance indexes with EI based on budget versus actual EI  
raph 2: The 2005 performance indexes with EI based on budget versus actual EI 
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 raph 3: The 2005 performance indexes with EI based on formula versus actual EI 
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